Occasional Paper Nº 39 (March 2018)

How the EU Promotes Regional Security in Southeast Asia

Naila Maier-Knapp
How the EU Promotes Regional Security in Southeast Asia

Naila Maier-Knapp

Series Editors
Jürgen Rüland, Judith Schlehe, Günther Schulze,
Sabine Dabringhaus, Stefan Seitz

Abstract
Various cross-border crises of the last few years, ranging from the Eurozone crisis to the series of terrorist attacks on European soil, have been important shapers of the EU’s current trajectory of regional security integration. At the same time, these crises and subsequent intra-regional institutional developments have been of interest to the EU’s international partners; especially to those who fear that the crises may affect trade and development cooperation with the EU. Some of these international partners – like the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – are observing the crisis-induced regional institutional dynamics in the EU closely in relation to their own regional integration project and the EU’s important role as a provider of regional integration support. In light of the significance of the EU in ASEAN’s community-building process, it is not a surprise that Southeast Asian partner countries and the ASEAN Secretariat ask with a view to their own regional security: What is the prospect of enhanced EU security engagement in Southeast Asia in today’s times of EU crisis?

Key words:
EU-ASEAN relations, regional security, regional integration, ARF, ASEM, IcSP

Author:
Naila Maier-Knapp conducts research on regionalism and inter-regionalism of the EU and ASEAN. She has published extensively on the EU’s security role in Southeast Asia and the impact of non-traditional security crises on ASEAN regionalism and EU-ASEAN inter-regionalism. She is currently working on a book project, which is to be the sequel to her book "Southeast Asia and the European Union: non-traditional security cooperation and crises" published by Routledge in 2014.

1 This manuscript is based on the author’s paper presented at the conference “Changing Realities of Regional Security” in the Philippines on 24 November 2017. An earlier version has been presented at the workshop “ASEAN, SAARC und Eurasische Union – Asiatischer Regionalismus im 21. Jahrhundert” at the University of Rostock in Germany on 23 June 2017.
1. Introduction

The refugee crisis and the terrorist attacks on European soil in the last few years have challenged the existing decision making and managerial capacity of the European Union (EU). They have necessitated institutional change and have been important shapers of the EU’s contemporary trajectory of regional integration. At the same time, institutional reflection, change, adaptation, and innovation are common processes belonging to the lifecycle of EU organizational structures. The cross-border crises named above and their respective discourses have thus acted as an additional influence – possibly accelerating institutional reforms already under way at the EU level – in making internal coordination and decision making procedures in the security domain more effective and enhancing the EU’s outward-oriented capacity. Most importantly, the crises have raised public awareness about security in Europe and the world, facilitating an environment conducive to long-term regional security and defense planning. For example, in recent times, this environment has been favorable in the case of the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO), allowing the deepening of defense cooperation amongst the member states in the years to come.\(^2\)

Furthermore, the crises and subsequent institutional developments have been of interest to the EU’s international partners, in particular to those that fear that the crises may affect trade and development cooperation with the EU. Some of these international partners – like the member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) – are observing these crisis-induced regional institutional dynamics in the EU closely in relation to their own regional integration project and the EU’s significance as a provider of regional integration support. From a security perspective, Southeast Asian governments are curious about the possible effects of the EU’s contemporary crisis-induced institutional security orientation on the official inter-regional security dialogue (Maier-Knapp 2016a, 2017d and 2017e). Is there – after Aceh – an opportunity for a second mission by the EU’s Common Security and Defense Policy (CSDP) to Southeast Asia? Is PESCO of any utility to EU-ASEAN security interaction? These are common questions asked by Southeast Asian policymakers and security pundits alike. Above all, given the current sense of uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific due to the tensions on the Korean peninsula and in the South China Sea – to name the most significant ones – Southeast Asian policymakers wonder: What is the overall prospect of enhanced EU security engagement in Southeast Asia in today’s times of crisis?

To answer this pertinent question in view of the fortieth birthday of the EU-ASEAN ministerial dialogue this year, this paper begins with an overview of EU-ASEAN security relations, highlighting recent promotion of security capacity within and between the two regional organizations. For the purpose of clarity, the following paragraphs focus on the EU’s security toolkit as a collective actor\(^3\) only.\(^4\) They first emphasize the EU’s improved outward-

\(^2\) Indeed, in the past three years, the notion of the EU as a security union has found more regular expression within the official speeches and press releases of EU officials. In particular, the incumbent President of the European Commission, Jean-Claude Juncker, has been foregrounding this idea since the terrorist attacks in 2015. For example, explicit reference to the idea of a security union was made in his joint press conference with French Prime Minister Manuel Valls on 23 March 2016 available at: www.europa.eu/rapid/press-release_AC-16-2142_en.htm, (accessed 18 March 2017), or his State of the European Union Address on 13 September 2017 available at: www.ec.europa.eu/commission/state-union-2017_en, (accessed 14 September 2017).

\(^3\) This implies the recognition of both supranational and intergovernmental tools available to the EU.

\(^4\) Despite predefining the research interest along security lines, this paper neither intends to neglect development cooperation as a global trademark of the EU per se nor securitize EU actorness towards Southeast...
oriented capacity as a security actor and then argue that ASEAN’s institutional advancement has facilitated greater absorptive and corresponding capacity on the side of the ASEAN Secretariat and the ASEAN member states in instances when the EU shares resources and experiences. After setting the institutional scene, the discussion turns to the current international structure of the Asia-Pacific to present the two main systemic arguments favorable for multilateralism and an enhanced EU-ASEAN security dialogue. Proceeding from a comprehensive and integrated security perspective that also takes into account systemic conditions and the central role of development cooperation and regional integration support within the EU’s political and security thinking towards Southeast Asia, this paper then centers on the most important instruments available to the EU as a security actor with and within Southeast Asia. These paragraphs are dedicated to, first, the most pertinent multilateral and inter-regional security dialogues to both sides and second, the one and only external security tool of the European Commission. This paper then concludes with a summary of the key arguments which support an enhanced EU-ASEAN security interaction, foregrounding the institutional advancement on both sides and, with this, the improved outward-oriented capacity and cooperation effectiveness as the essential shapers of contemporary EU-ASEAN security interaction.

2. Overview of EU-ASEAN Security Relations

Formal security relations between the EU and ASEAN were established with the inauguration of the official ministerial meetings between the two regional organizations in the late 1970s. The first ministerial meeting of the member states of the European Communities (EC) and ASEAN was held in 1978, marking the official launch of the region-to-region dialogue. Although the early years of the official dialogue exhibited the prevalence of economic interests, the political underpinnings of the Cold War were pervasive and necessitated a common political strategy, especially after the invasion of Kampuchea by Communist Vietnam in 1978 and the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union in 1979. The Joint Statement of Political Issues, presented at the 2nd ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting in 1980, provided this overall strategic and political direction for the EC-ASEAN dialogue during the Cold War period. Towards the end of the Cold War, however, the Joint Statement became increasingly irrelevant and the traditional security agenda of East versus West expanded to incorporate new challenges that particularly stemmed from the effects of regionalization and globalization processes – in particular environmental issues – in the respective regions. With the end of the Cold War, the new security agenda further expanded throughout the 1990s and early 2000s. In this time, pressures in the EU’s immediate neighborhood compelled the member states to consider security and defense integration seriously. Following the meeting

---

1 Recent EU foreign and security policy strategy documents refer to this term in the sense of the EU enhancing its internal coordination capacity for improved implementation of the strategy papers and plan of actions.
2 Building on the notion of peace through transactionalism and regional integration, the EU has been interested in sharing its experience with other regions. Throughout the history of EU-ASEAN relations, the EU and its member states have devoted special attention to this kind of support, with evermore interest and budget allocations, as seen in the current budget cycle until 2020.
3 Although common positions were expressed at the United Nations level, the unfolding events and tendencies of non-alignment in Southeast Asia required additional affirmation of the common political and security direction.
of St Malo in 1998, CSDP was created and became operational in 2003 with its first mission to Macedonia.

Taking global developments and the blurry lines between traditional security and humanitarian engagement into account, CSDP was designed with a military and civilian component. While the 11 September attacks in 2001 refocused international attention on traditional military capacity, this hardly affected the dual-tracked development upon which CSDP had embarked. On 15 September 2005, the first CSDP mission to Southeast Asia was launched in Aceh. This security operation was a civilian CSDP mission and was implemented by EU member states in collaboration with five ASEAN member states and two non-EU European countries. The tasks of this mission were specified in the operational plan (OPLAN) of the Council of the EU and defined by the demands within the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Government of Indonesia. The tasks of OPLAN centered on the EU’s peacemaking, peacebuilding, and peace maintaining capacity. They have been implemented successfully and have also been identified as operational strengths within other CSDP missions, informing ongoing development of CSDP and positively influencing the EU’s image as one of the most important peace projects in the world. Although the Aceh Monitoring Mission has shown that the EU is a unique type of peace or security operator with added value for Southeast Asia, there have not been any other CSDP operations in the region since. This is not to say that there has been a lack of interest on both sides. Indeed, continuous EU engagement in some conflict zones in Southeast Asia suggests otherwise and points to an environment favorable for new CSDP operations. That said, current intra-regional developments within the EU and ASEAN – namely nationalist and populist narratives in both regions – are complicating prospects for CSDP missions to Southeast Asia in the near future, given the unanimous decision making that is required for CSDP operations.

While CSDP operations in Southeast Asia appear unlikely against the backdrop of the current political climate in the EU, there are recent structural improvements that have expanded the European Commission’s foreign and security competencies and are allowing more active security engagement in Southeast Asia. Specifically, the Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace (IcSP) can be employed without complex and lengthy decision making, unlike the intergovernmental CSDP. This does not mean that IcSP and other structural improvements are replacing the unique dual capacity of CSDP. Rather, they offer a complementary pathway for the EU to address security challenges and crises in partner countries. In particular, those institutional changes within the European Commission and the European External Action Service (EEAS) which have been driven by a security-development rationale, are considered

---

8 The MoU was achieved on 15 August 2005 with the financial support of the EU’s Rapid Reaction Mechanism (RRM).
9 These tasks are: monitor demobilization of GAM as well as monitor and assist with decommissioning and destruction of its weapons; monitor the relocation of military forces and police troops; monitor the reintegration of GAM members; monitor the human rights situation with specific reference to aforementioned tasks; monitor legislation change processes; rule on disputed amnesty cases; investigate and rule on complaints and alleged violations of MoU; and establish liaisons and maintain good cooperation with all parties. Please see for example press release 12137/05 or Joint Action 11681/05 of the Council of the European Union on 9 September 2005 for further information.
10 In most scholarly treatments, authors have referred to either the security-development nexus or security-development linkage, emphasizing the inter-relatedness of actions within the two policy realms as well as the similarities in policy implementation. For further reading on the security-development nexus driving
pertinent to contemporary security engagement of the EU in Southeast Asia. In light of this rationale as driver, support of ASEAN regional integration through EU-ASEAN development cooperation programs has therefore been commonly considered to strengthen the political cohesion and regional security of Southeast Asia (Jetschke & Portela 2012: 2). Prominently, IcSP has been informed by the security-development rationale and has become significant for ad hoc emergency financing in Southeast Asia. It is actively employed in Southeast Asian security hotspots of ethnic strife, ranging from Rakhine State to Mindanao to Southern Thailand, as well as in the context of combating transregional threats across the ASEAN member states. In light of this security impact in the region, however temporary, IcSP could pave the way for CSDP operations in Southeast Asia in the future.\footnote{Noteworthy in this context is the establishment of the EEAS delegations in the wake of the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009. They allow for better demand orientation and expression of EU security interests. Furthermore, they provide an institutional home for newer EU instruments, including IcSP.}

Although the introduction has focused on a crisis-centered narrative, the main influence for the EU’s current institutional development in the realm of defense and security is defined above all by the Lisbon Treaty. Similar to the EU, ASEAN regional institutional integration in the last decade has been considerably informed and guided by various ASEAN agreements and strategy documents. In the context of ASEAN’s security and defense dimension, the ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) Blueprint has provided key guidance for ASEAN capacity building. It has enabled better interaction with the EU and absorption of the experience and expertise that has been shared by the EU. Thus, in summary, although recent crisis narratives in the individual regions have played their parts in reinforcing institutional advancements, it is the strategy documents, framework policies, and multi-year work plans that have ensured programmatic continuity of the respective pathways of institutional integration.\footnote{The Kuala Lumpur Declaration from 1997 and the Bali Concord II from 2003 provided important impetus for the establishment of APSC. With the Vientiane Action Programme from 2004-2010 the APSC-building process was fleshed out. In 2009, the first APSC Blueprint offered clearer guidance for the institutional development of the ASEAN security dimension. This first Blueprint has now expired with the inauguration of the ASEAN Community in December 2015. A new set of ASEAN Community Blueprints has now been ratified, lasting until 2025.}

Today, ASEAN possesses multiple institutions and institutional arrangements to manage regional security issues and external relations. In light of this institutional expansion towards a full-functioning ASEAN Community, it is understandable that at the thirtieth ASEAN Summit in Manila in 2017, commemorating fifty years of ASEAN, the chairman’s statement was written in an ambitious manner, signaling strength to the people of ASEAN, as well as to international partners.\footnote{Amongst others, the Chairman’s Statement stated in paragraph two that ASEAN under the presidency of the Philippines will work towards being “a model of regionalism, a global player.”} The EU especially welcomes ASEAN’s ambitions and language of strength. It has always been supportive of ASEAN’s institutional development, desiring ASEAN as a politically coherent international partner within the EU’s multilateral worldview. In particular, the European Commission has assisted the ASEAN regional level actively through regional integration support programs, provoking depictions of the EU as an external federator (cf. Rüland 2001: 17). In the new budget cycle of the EU’s regional integration support to the ASEAN Secretariat and the member states, the EU has earmarked institutional developments, see Doidge & Holland (2012). For lessons learnt from EU engagement overseas and assessing the institutional effectiveness of the security-development nexus critically, see Youngs (2007) and Smith (2013).
a budget of some EUR170 million for the period 2014-2020. This amounts to an approximate increase of EUR100 million from the previous cycle between 2007-2013, more than doubling the previous commitment (European Commission 2015). Against this backdrop, it can be said that in spite of the many introverted and nationalist narratives gaining ground in the member states of both regional organizations at the present time, there continue to be the means, room, and willingness to deepen the EU-ASEAN relationship and with this EU-ASEAN security relations.

3. Systemic Uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific

In addition to the outlined institutional developments, there have also been systemic conditions in the Asia-Pacific in recent times which have provided an environment conducive to multilateral cooperation and, hence, EU-ASEAN inter-regional interaction. Paradoxically, current heightened levels of uncertainty in particular – originating mainly in Sino-Southeast Asian tensions over the South China Sea dispute and the presidential elections in the United States (US) – could be perceived as an opportunity for multilateralism, given the need for confidence building efforts beyond the bilateral level. Especially for those Southeast Asian countries involved in disputes with China over the rocks and islands in the South China Sea, multilateral fora provide important venues to garner the support of the international community and complement Sino-Southeast Asian bilateral efforts which have clearly exhibited Chinese disdain for the use of ASEAN dispute settlement mechanisms and, hence, for ASEAN’s political role (cf. Maier-Knapp 2016b: 9 and 16). Concomitantly, those international actors who consider themselves to be in unfavorable situations of low credibility and confidence will be eager to increase diplomacy at all possible levels in order to improve their international positioning. Specifically, this was traceable within the bilateral interaction between the Philippines and China in the wake of the South China Sea arbitration, resulting in an intensification of financial and economic incentives from China to the Philippines on the one hand and continued commitment to multilateralism on the other (Maier-Knapp 2017b and 2017c). Amongst others, this multilateral commitment meant explicit reference to the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) by both sides (Maier-Knapp 2017c). Notwithstanding this general opportunity for multilateralism and EU-ASEAN interaction, Sino-centered bilateralisms are also flourishing and continuing to expand the Chinese sphere of influence in a manner that is uncomfortable for China’s neighbors and the regional powers alike.

The Trump administration’s mixed economic signals – including the withdrawal from the Transpacific Partnership (TPP) – have added to this sense of uncertainty in the region. That said, the economic inward-orientation of the US did not come as a complete surprise, since the previous pivot to Asia under the Obama administration did not result in an increase in US economic strength in the region. Defense and security signals from Washington under the Trump presidency, however, display continuity of the Obama strategy. In particular, regular high-profile visits14 by US defense and foreign policy officials to Southeast Asia and the strong

---

14 The official visit by Admiral Harris from Pacific Command to the Cobra Gold military exercise in Thailand in February 2017, Vice President Mike Pence’s visit to the ASEAN Secretariat in April 2017, Secretary of Defense James Mattis’ attendance of the Shangri-La Dialogue in June 2017, and scheduled visits by President Trump to the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) meeting in Vietnam and the East Asia Summit (EAS) in the Philippines in November 2017.
US participation in joint military exercises in the Asia-Pacific underline US commitment to the region. This continued commitment was most recently observable, for example, in the Philippines when the US military provided technical support to the Filipino military in its fight against Maute rebels in Marawi City. Nevertheless, there is room for improvement in the current US approach to Southeast Asia to achieve higher levels of reassurance and a more effective mitigation of tensions.

4. Relevant Multilateral Fora for EU-ASEAN Security Interaction

Against the backdrop of the outlined institutional and systemic developments, this paper foresees greater Western European political and security interest in Southeast Asia. This opportunity for security dialogue and cooperation between the regions will be particularly observable in those multilateral dialogue fora in which the EU and ASEAN address security matters jointly, namely within inter-regional settings. The following paragraphs will discuss the most relevant multilateral/inter-regional dialogue fora to the EU-ASEAN security interaction, focusing on the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), ASEM, and the EU-ASEAN Dialogue. This discussion is then followed by an assessment of IcSP, effectively the European Commission’s only security instrument for addressing security crises and transregional security threats around the world.

ASEAN Regional Forum

The ARF is the only multilateral regional security forum in the Asia-Pacific, at which the EU participates on behalf of its member states alongside ten ASEAN member states, Australia, Bangladesh, China, India, Japan, Canada, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, East Timor, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Russia, Sri Lanka, South Korea, and the US. All of these members work closely with the ASEAN Secretariat when setting the ARF agenda and work program. Although the forum is centered on ASEAN’s security interests, effective cooperation to tackle these security challenges is not the immediate objective of the ARF. Rather, work agendas are guided by a three-step plan which foresees a functional evolution of the forum from confidence building to preventive diplomacy and, ultimately, to effective regional capacity building for conflict management (Katsumata 2009: 84-6). The work programs are designed accordingly, but do not necessarily draw upon security issues exclusive to ASEAN to advance these steps. In fact, the majority of the security challenges addressed in ARF mirror wider Asia-Pacific and global security agendas. This has kept intra-member sensitivities at a low and hence, enabled considerable progression of the first two steps, confidence building and preventive diplomacy, within the overall ARF work plan.

Specifically, ARF activities in the early 2000s have suggested that ARF has progressed beyond confidence building and is paying heightened attention to preventive diplomacy (Haacke 2009: 443; Emmers & Tan 2011: 90). Some progression or security activism has been attributed to “activist states” (Haacke 2009: 446). Other instances suggest favorable systemic conditions and pressures enforcing more cooperative behavior amongst otherwise possibly disruptive states. While the EU has not been an activist actor in the ARF in the sense of a state as an actor, it has always been supportive of confidence building dialogue irrespective of the fluid

---

15 Reuters, 11 June 2017. “Philippines’ Duterte says didn’t seek U.S. support in city siege.”
16 In the context of the EU-ASEAN dialogue and IcSP, special attention is paid to the nexus between security and development.
international structure. Indeed, “using experience gained from OSCE [Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe] confidence building and preventive diplomacy mechanisms and strategies”, the EU has the potential to address conflicts in Asia (Berkofsky 2003: 2). However, limited supranational competencies prior to the ratification of the Lisbon Treaty in 2009 and the considerable US lead on ARF security discourses and developments in the late 1990s and early 2000s have seen the EU punch below its weight on matters of confidence building and preventive diplomacy in ARF (Maier-Knapp 2014: 75-76). As a consequence, a distinct EU-ASEAN or EU inspiration for the behavioral norms of ARF and the ARF members has been difficult to identify.

Since 2009, various ARF disaster relief exercises have suggested that some ARF activities have even moved beyond confidence building and preventive diplomacy, facilitating the enhancement of synergy effects, operational standards, interoperability, and consequently the codification of relevant conduct as well as the build-up of capabilities for effective conflict management. At the same time, it is important to keep in mind that these activities and their output have often drawn upon codified conduct and operational standards that have already been generated and have guided work within other dialogue fora, especially within UN agencies at the global level. Moreover, the member states’ preference for non-interference complicates the generation of distinct ARF norms and approaches to regional conflict resolution. Following a non-confrontational working mode, ARF members are reluctant to broach sensitive regional issues exclusive to ASEAN. There have been occasional discussions pertaining to the disputes of the Khao Preah Vihear temple, the South China Sea or East Timor directly. These attempts, however, have generally been short-lived and have seen immediate reference to the principle of non-interference. Oftentimes, discussion of the disputes was reframed in an indirect manner, building on wider regional and global narratives of lower sensitivity.

Paradoxically, it is this circumvention of sensitive regional security issues of Southeast Asia which has opened space for interaction and has contributed to the endurance of the ARF as a “regional security” forum. Most importantly, this has rendered the EU able to plug in and share relevant expertise. In particular, global security “threats” such as climate change and maritime security have become areas in which the EU has been strengthening its security impact in the ARF. For example, being co-host of the ARF Seminar on International Security Implications of Climate-related Events and Trends with Cambodia from 19 until 20 March 2009 has underlined the EU’s avant-garde role in shaping the climate change agenda within ARF. In recent years, the EU has especially advanced its interest in maritime security in the region. Already in 2009 in Surabaya, the EU took interest in this field and co-hosted an ARF seminar concerning maritime security. From 2017 until 2020, the EU will be the chair of the ARF Inter-Sessional Meeting on Maritime Security alongside Australia and Vietnam. Contemporary EU interest in maritime security suggests the influence of previously described systemic uncertainty in the Asia-Pacific, facilitating convergent EU and ASEAN security interests.

While recent crises in the EU did not have a direct impact on EU engagement in ARF – beyond prioritization of certain threats such as counter terrorism, it is evident that the crises have
brought about and accelerated some institutional developments in the EU which could become of interest to the ARF members in the years to come. That said, the developing countries of ASEAN may be less concerned about some of the global threats that have severely affected the EU in recent years. In fact, they would draw greater benefits from a security agenda that pays more attention to the interconnectedness of security and development.

**Asia-Europe Meeting**

Similar to ARF, ASEM also came into being in Bangkok in the 1990s to anchor Asia within the new international order that had emerged after the end of the Cold War. On 1 March 1996 representatives of the EU member states, the European Commission, seven ASEAN countries, China, Japan, and South Korea met in Thailand for the first ASEM Summit, inaugurating ASEM as an inter-regional dialogue forum for Europe and Asia. Over the years, membership broadened numerically to fifty-three members. Unlike the ARF, ASEM is a comprehensive dialogue process with the political and security pillar being one out of three ASEM pillars, of which the economic pillar has been the key driver of the dialogue process. The economic pillar has been dominant since the beginning, in light of the considerable interest in overcoming the triadic imbalance of the US-centered trade relations between world regions in the 1990s (Dent 1997).

The security agenda of ASEM is similar to the ARF agenda in the sense that many topics mirror those discussed at the global level and are treated in a manner that is aligned with the ASEAN Way, particularly building on the principle of non-interference. This cultural lining and concomitant low degree of institutionalization of ASEM have provided an environment of low pressure conducive to confidence building. Thus, similar to ARF, the EU in ASEM has ample opportunity to contribute towards confidence building, information exchange, and interest coordination that could inform security discourses and developments in Southeast Asia and complement the security agenda at the global level. The added value of ASEM for global order thus resembles that of ARF functionally. At best, ASEM’s political and security dialogue enhances the “transparency of policy positions, thus creating greater predictability for negotiations in global fora” (Rüland 2001: 26). This builds on the premise that “inter- and transregional dialogues … streamline the overburdened agenda of global organizations, keep in check the ensuing bottlenecks at the top level of the international system and thus prevent a suffocation of global institutions” (Rüland 2002: 7). Hence, ASEM holds high potential to expand its function as a structuring agent of global order (Löwen 2006: 4-6; Dosch & Maier-Knapp 2017: 107; Maier-Knapp 2010: 90). This said, the EU and other actors have fallen short in making effective use of ASEM’s structuration potential and its institutional size for the purpose of streamlining security discourses to influence the global security agenda in a distinct Asian-European way. If at all, it has been against the backdrop of regional or global crises that the EU and other ASEM members have considered ASEM as a platform to coordinate and push security interests. These instances have, however, mainly centered on advancing communication, common interests, and shared understandings amongst each

---

19 At the same time, ASEM’s size has been a mixed blessing for the effectiveness of ASEM’s security dialogue. To avoid general ineffectiveness and forum fatigue, instruments have been introduced which also provide opportunity for sensitive and niche security topics to be discussed, amongst others, within small groups of interested members or under the umbrella of leadership or activist states.
other (Dosch 2003: 497; Maier-Knapp 2017b: 12 and 15).

**EU-ASEAN Dialogue**

The third pertinent dialogue mechanism for security interaction is the ministerial EU-ASEAN dialogue. It was inaugurated in 1978 with the first ASEAN-EC Ministerial Meeting, offering dialogue space to the members of the regional organizations to discuss economic, socio-cultural, and political and security interests. While the security agenda resembles that of ARF and ASEM, the narrower membership base of the EU-ASEAN dialogue allows for a more region-specific focus, in particular in relation to security issues at the nexus of security and development. Over the years, many inter-regional EU-ASEAN programs have been designed and implemented on the basis of this nexus. These programs have been conducive to regional cohesion and resilience. These support programs have also assisted intra-regional confidence building and shaped norms and principles of regional cooperation (Doidge 2007; Fraser 2010; Jetschke 2013). For example, with a view to security cooperation specifically, despite continued preference for bilateral interaction and the sanctity of national sovereignty in ASEAN affairs, incremental interaction has raised levels of confidence and invited to more tangible interaction including joint commitments and actions on regional security on various occasions. This was, for instance, evident in the EU-ASEAN Joint Declaration on Cooperation to Combat Terrorism in 2003 or the Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005. Even though these instances of interaction with tangible security output are rare, it is expected that in the current crisis-ridden times and an increased EU budget for regional integration support to ASEAN, the EU-ASEAN dialogue will be of greater significance in giving direction to the overall EU programming of security cooperation with Southeast Asian partners.

**Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace**

Another EU mechanism that has been considerably informed by the security-development nexus is IcSP. This instrument is employed worldwide to combat transregional security threats and prevent, as well as manage, crisis situations. It is one of the few security instruments available to the European Commission in its external relations for short-term financing of emergency and crisis situations overseas. In 2014, IcSP Regulation 230/2014 replaced the Instrument for Stability (IfS) Regulation 1717/2006. IfS was effective from 2006 until 2014, succeeding the RRM, which lasted from 2001 until 2006 in accordance with Regulation 381/2001. RRM and its successor instruments IfS and IcSP are emergency instruments that can be employed at short notice for a limited amount of time, ideally until EU programs kick in. The total budget of IcSP for the period 2014 until 2020 is EUR2.3 billion, managed by the Service for Foreign Policy Instruments (FPI) and the Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development (DG DEVCO).

At the time of writing, there are a handful of IcSP projects ongoing in Southeast Asia: namely Rakhine State in Myanmar and Mindanao in the Philippines. While these ongoing projects are of bilateral nature targeting ASEAN countries individually, there have been IcSP initiatives focused on capacity building at the regional level. IcSP thus offers unique added

---

20 Amongst others, the website www.icspmap.eu provides this figure for 2014 until 2020. Currently, some of it has been dispersed to 270 IcSP-funded projects in seventy-one countries worldwide.

21 According to www.icspmap.eu, nine IcSP projects were ongoing in Southeast Asia in 2017. While this website generally provides an up-to-date snapshot of overall engagement in the region, it appears that mainly DG DEVCO sponsored activities are accounted for.
value to Southeast Asia in the form of EU regional ‘security’ integration support. Both bilateral and regional approaches focus on civilian capacity building for conflict prevention and protection of civilians. They are not designed to address violent conflicts directly. Despite FPI’s and DG DEVCO’s cautious employment of IcSP to ensure complementarity with the competencies of the Council and the member states and to guarantee appropriate engagement in difficult local settings, there remains room to criticize the extent of securitization within the EU’s supranational agency, given that the regulation allows for traditional issues – such as ethnic conflict, terrorism, and chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) threats – to be addressed by DG DEVCO directly through IcSP under the heading of security (Maier-Knapp 2017a: 69). De facto, the majority of IcSP projects implemented in Southeast Asia expands the European Commission’s security agency: amongst others, they exhibit methodologies and resources which traditionally fall under development cooperation. Thus, even though there is institutional division of labor between FPI and DG DEVCO to counter issues of securitization, IcSP remains sensitive because it opens space for the European Commission to develop a robust capacity for ad hoc and short-term external engagement.

5. Conclusions

After four decades of official EU-ASEAN relations, security interests between the two regions have become of greater importance to both sides. The main focus of this paper was to outline more recent institutional and systemic developments favorable for EU-ASEAN security interaction and the EU as a security actor in Southeast Asia. This paper thus provided an up-to-date assessment, which furthermore may have given hope that the EU is a step closer to its goal of upgrading the EU-ASEAN relationship to a Strategic Partnership and becoming a member at the table of the East Asia Summit (EAS) and ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM+). The discussion began with an overview of key contemporary institutional and systemic conditions. It then outlined the actual space for security interaction between the two regions through the discussion of the relevant dialogue fora – ARF, ASEM, and the EU-ASEAN dialogue – and the European Commission’s emergency and security instrument, IcSP. The discussion of the fora made clear that the EU’s contemporary security engagement in the region centers on confidence building and the sharing of expertise. Thereby, the global security agenda – and not the regional security agenda – has been seminal in facilitating themes for confidence building activities. The paper further argued that the ASEAN states seem comfortable with this focus on the global agenda and do not see this as a disadvantage to their regional security interests. In fact, this focus assists them in managing and limiting interference in intra-ASEAN state of affairs.

At the same time, although the security agendas of the discussed fora mirrored the global security agenda in large parts, this paper saw unique EU-ASEAN potential for enhanced security interaction in connection with themes at the nexus of security and development. In light of the developing status of many ASEAN member states, programs building on this nexus pertain to the regional security and stability of Southeast Asia specifically. Furthermore, the nexus between security and development has been a decisive shaper of the EU’s very own institution building efforts, especially within EEAS. This was exemplified in

22 CSDP has not been discussed in detail in this chapter because the one and only CSDP security operation in Southeast Asia was the Aceh Monitoring Mission in 2005.
the IcSP section in relation to the two different institutional homes of IcSP, FPI and DG DEVCO. The institutional recognition of the security-development nexus should, however, not suggest the securitization of institutions, actors, and approaches. Indeed, the European Commission is committed to countering and controlling securitization within its institutions, but grey areas remain and complicate distinctive sector-specific or agential behavioral patterns.

Conclusively, amidst the security crises and institutional developments towards a security union in Europe, the EU’s current security approach to Southeast Asia reveals greater compatibility with Southeast Asian security interests. Moreover, in light of ASEAN’s community-building process and progress, current crisis-induced EU regional integration experiences in the realm of security and defense could become of greater interest to the ASEAN Secretariat and ASEAN member states in the future and be shared through the EU-ASEAN inter-regional level. Currently, the EU’s security profile in the Asia-Pacific remains largely EU-driven, nurtured by the leadership of individual EU member states, EEAS activism, and incremental institutional adaptation rather than the temperature of US-Southeast Asian relations and other systemic factors. Like no other regional organization, the EU has managed to develop a nuanced foreign and security capacity, capable of self-correction/-reflection and profound intra-regional debates. Hence, limitations and problems of EU capacity in connection with the three dialogue fora and IcSP originate most of the time within intra-EU foreign and security processes. This suggests that EU-ASEAN relations are to a considerable degree contingent on intra-regional power structures and EU politics. Thus, contemporary EU regional crises and developments – reinforcing the EU internal and external security perspective – are raising the probability of an enhanced security dialogue between the EU and ASEAN in the years to come.

ASEAN member states (2017) Partnering for Change, Engaging the World, Chairman’s Statement of the 30th ASEAN Summit, Manila.


Maier-Knapp, N (2017d) “Managing Cross-border Crises in Southeast Asia at Multiple Levels of Governance: complementary or competitive institutional developments at the national, ASEAN regional and EU-ASEAN inter-regional levels?” Asia-Europe Institute Insights 3(1): 4-17.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Definition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADMM+</td>
<td>ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Meeting Plus</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APSC</td>
<td>ASEAN Political and Security Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEM</td>
<td>Asia-Europe Meeting</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSDP</td>
<td>Common Security and Defense Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DG DEVCO</td>
<td>Directorate-General for International Cooperation and Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>East Asia Summit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC</td>
<td>European Communities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEAS</td>
<td>European External Action Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPI</td>
<td>Service for Foreign Policy Instruments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GAM</td>
<td>Free Aceh Movement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IcSP</td>
<td>Instrument contribution to Stability and Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IfS</td>
<td>Instrument for Stability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MoU</td>
<td>Memorandum of Understanding</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPLAN</td>
<td>Operational plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRM</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Mechanism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPP</td>
<td>Trans Pacific Partnership</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US</td>
<td>United States</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Occasional Paper Series: Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Freiburg

No 38 (2018) Ganesan, Narayanan – Bilateral Issues in Myanmar’s Policy towards China
No 37 (2017) Fünfgeld, Anna – Governing Resources, Governing People: From Timber to Coal in Indonesia
No 36 (2017) Muyutel, Maria; Sankdähler, Evamaria – (In)visible Ethnicity: Celebrating Chinese and Indian Descent in Indonesia
No 34 (2016) Rüland, Jürgen – Coping with Crisis: Southeast Asian Regionalism and the Ideational Constraint of Reform
No 33 (2016) Han, Xiaorong – How Special has the Special Relationship between China and Vietnam been?
No 32 (2016) Tomsa, Dirk – Beyond the Executive Toolbox: Regime Continuity in Indonesia’s Multiparty Presidential Democracy
No 31 (2016) Schlehe, Judith; Nisa, Eva F. – The Meanings of Moderate Islam in Indonesia: Alignments and Dealignments of Azharites
No 30 (2016) Hill, Hall; Aswicahyono, Haryo – Is Indonesia Trapped in the Middle?
No 28 (2015) Rüland, Jürgen – Democratizing Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia and the Democratization of ASEAN: A Role Theory Analysis
No 27 (2015) Rüland, Jürgen – Why (Most) Indonesian Businesses Fear the ASEAN Economic Community. Struggling with Southeast Asia’s Regional Corporatism
No 26 (2015) Beeson, Mark – Can ASEAN Cope with China?
No 24 (2015) Schlehe, Judith – Cosmopolitanism in the Modern Mystical World of Java
No 23 (2015) Watson Andaya, Barbara – „.Come Home, Come Home!“ - Chineseness, John Sung and Theatrical Evangelism in 1930s Southeast Asia
No 22 (2014) Rüland, Jürgen – Paradoxes and Unintended Consequences of Interregional Democracy Promotion: Normative and Conceptual Misunderstandings in EU-ASEAN Relations
No 21 (2014) Gonschorek, Gerrit-Johannes; Hornbacher-Schönleber, Sophia; Well, Mareike – Perceptions of Indonesia’s Decentralization – The Role of Performance Based Grants and Participatory Planning in Public Health Service Delivery
No 20 (2014) Roces, Mina – A Space in Social Memory – Filipina/o American Migrations as Community Historians, 1906-2010
No 19 (2014) Kis-Katos, Krisztina; Sparrow, Robert – Poverty, Labour Markets and Trade Liberalization in Indonesia
No 18 (2013) Nguitragool, Paruedee – Indonesia, the West and International Politics: A Survey of Indonesian Student Perceptions of Self and Others in International Relations
No 17 (2013) Kis-Katos-Krisztina; Sjahir, Bambang Suharnoko; Schulze, Günther, G. - Political Budget Cycles in Local Indonesia
No 16 (2013) Kis-Katos, Krisztina; Sjahir, Bambang Suharnoko – Does local governments’ responsiveness increase with decentralization and democratization?
No 14 (2013) Chachavalpongpun, Pavin – Thailand’s Red Networks: From Street Forces to Eminent Civil Society Coalitions

N° 11 (2012) Fünfgeld, Anna; Lücking, Mirjam; Platte, Florian – How can Public Standards Contribute to Social Welfare through the Improvement of Public Service Delivery


N° 9 (2012) Thianthai, Chulanee – Perceptions of Democracy among Thai Adolescents


N° 6 (2011) Rüland, Jürgen – Constructing Regionalism Domestically: Local Actors and Foreign Policymaking in Indonesia


N° 2 (2011) Rüland, Jürgen; Bechle, Karsten – Defending State-Centric Regionalism through Mimicry and Localization: Regional Parliamentary Bodies in ASEAN and MERCOSUR


Please do not quote or cite without permission of the author. Comments are very welcome. Requests and inquiries concerning reproduction and rights should be addressed to the author in the first instance. See the full publication series at: http://www.southeastasianstudies.uni-freiburg.de/publications/op-series
Southeast Asian Studies at the University of Freiburg

Information & Contact

E-Mail: mail@southeastasianstudies.uni-freiburg.de
Web: www.southeastasianstudies.uni-freiburg.de

Participating Departments

Politics: www.politik.uni-freiburg.de
Anthropology: www.ethno.uni-freiburg.de
History: www.geschichte.uni-freiburg.de
Economics: www.vwl.uni-freiburg.de/iwipol/sopo.htm